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A NEUROSCIENCE OF
ENLIGHTENMENT?
The field of contemplative science is
rapidly growing and integrating into the
basic neurosciences, psychology, clinical
sciences, and society-at-large. Yet the
majority of current research in the con-
templative sciences has been divorced
from the soteriological context fromwhich
these meditative practices originate and
has focused instead on clinical applica-
tions with goals of stress reduction and
psychotherapeutic health. In the exist-
ing research on health outcomes of
mindfulness-based clinical interventions,
for example, there have been almost no
attempts to scientifically investigate the
goal of enlightenment. This is a serious
oversight, given that such profound trans-
formation across ethical, perceptual, emo-
tional, and cognitive domains are taken
to be the natural outcome and principle
aim of mindfulness practice in the tradi-
tional Buddhist contexts from which these
practices are derived. If short-term inter-
ventions as short as a few sessions are
now beginning to produce neuroplastic
changes (Tang et al., 2010; Zeidan et al.,
2010; Xue et al., 2011), it may be that
even in secular contexts, practitioners are
already developing states and traits that are
associated with progress toward enlight-
enment. In order to carefully assess the
potential effects of meditative interven-
tions it is of singular importance to ask
whether enlightenment can be traced to




Unfortunately, the first answer to
this question is “No.” The term
‘‘enlightenment” is an extraordinarily
imprecise construct. Using the term
enlightenment or even the term more
native to Buddhist traditions, “awaken-
ing” (bodhi), as if it referred to a single
outcome either privileges one conception
over others or else assumes that there is
some commonality among the traditional
goals of diverse contemplative traditions.
There are deep disagreements over the
nature of the goal between and even
within various Buddhist schools. Scientific
investigations cannot assume that there
is any commonality among the transfor-
mative changes referred to as “kensho,”
“stream entry,” “realizing the nature of
mind,” and so on, that various Buddhist
traditions take as various stages of awak-
ening. Empirical investigations of these
constructs can only proceed with reference
to the specific psychological and behav-
ioral outcomes described in the native
discourse of a specific tradition (see Lutz
et al., 2007). Because we do not have space
here to offer detailed examinations of the
theoretical context and neurobiological
characterization of enlightenment as it is
specified in multiple Buddhist traditions,
we focus here on one specific example,
that of the Therava¯da Buddhist tradition
of the Burmese meditation master Mahasi
Sayadaw. Nonetheless, by applying more
generally the approach we adopt here for
this tradition, claims for commonality or
differences between psychological states
and traits associated with various tra-
ditional goals can be operationalized as
testable hypotheses.
While some Buddhist traditions under-
stand the goal of nibba¯na just as a cessation
of unwholesome mental states, Mahasi
Sayadaw maintains that nibba¯na “can be
seen inwardly as the cessation of all phe-
nomena” (Sayadaw, 1992). This Therava¯da
Buddhist tradition distinguishes between a
“path” moment and the immediately sub-
sequent “fruition” state, which can later be
repeated and cultivated. As Khema (1994)
describes it, “the path moment doesn’t
have any thinking or feeling in it. . .While
the meditative absorptions bring with
them a feeling of oneness, of unity, the
path moment does not even contain that.
The moment of fruition, subsequent to the
path moment, is the understood experi-
ence and results in a turned-around vision
of existence. . . The new understanding rec-
ognizes every thought, every feeling as
stress (dukkha)” (Khema, 1994). Of par-
ticular note here is how the “fruition”
attainment (phala-sama¯patti) of experi-
encing or “seeing” cessation that results
from insight practice is sharply distin-
guished by these Theravâda teachers from
various results of concentration, includ-
ing the cessation of consciousness char-
acteristic of the concentrative absorp-
tion nirodha sama¯patti (Griffiths, 1986),
as well as from secular goals of stress
reduction, and also from other Buddhist
conceptions. For instance, according to
some schools of Tibetan Buddhism, an
enlightened awareness “sees” all phe-
nomena as truly beyond suffering, as
an inseparable emptiness-luminosity-bliss
state, not different in nature from aware-
ness itself.
Given the differences between various
competing conceptions of awakening, one
scientific approach to tracing enlighten-
ment would be to use the tools of social
psychology to investigate which states and
traits are valued in a particular commu-
nity. For instance, recent work in moral
psychology suggests how value judgments
of people and practices as either enlight-
ened or unenlightened could be traced
to affective reactions of admiration and
disgust (Rozin et al., 1999; Schnall et al.,
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2008; Brandt and Reyna, 2011; Schnall and
Roper, 2011). Some of the most virulent
disagreements over what counts as genuine
awakening occur between closely related
practice traditions, such as the debates
between various Therava¯da Buddhist tra-
ditions in Burma over which states are
to count as realizations of nibba¯na and
which are instead to be counted (merely)
as states of deep concentration. Surveying
these debates, Sharf (1995) concludes
“there is no public consensus as to
the application of terms that supposedly
refer to discreet experiential states within
the vipassana¯ movement” (Sharf, 1995,
p. 265).
It is important in this regard to sep-
arate two sorts of disagreement, the one
centering on which states are taken to be
worthy of the title of awakening, the other
on the accuracy of self-reports of experi-
ential states that may reflect markers of
progress. Even within communities where
there is consensus on which states/traits
deserve to be called enlightened, there can
be disagreement over whether or not par-
ticular individuals have attained these. In
practice, as Sharf (1995) details, Buddhist
teachers do not accept self-reports of med-
itative experience at face value, but instead
assess whether a particular reported state
should be counted as a case of realization
depending on practice history, the man-
ner and emotional state with which the
report is given, and retrospective obser-
vations of behavior. This kind of skep-
ticism is emphasized in Buddhist theory
(Olendzki, 2010) and also recent cogni-
tive science (Clark, 1997; Knauper and
Turner, 2003; Mehling et al., 2009) sug-
gesting unreliability of self-report, due to
affective biases of attention and memory,
as well as poor validity and generaliz-
ability. Fortunately, objective measures of
such affective biases of perception and
cognition have been developed (Elliott
et al., 2010), and recent work suggests
that certain forms of meditation prac-
tice may function precisely by attenuating
such biases (Vago and Nakamura, 2011;
Garland et al., 2012; Van Vugt et al., 2012;
Kang et al., 2013). This leads us to a qual-
ified optimism for studies drawing on a
nuanced understanding of the specific tra-
ditional context of a specific conception
of enlightenment and leveraging objective
measures of experiential acuity.
A QUALIFIED YES: RECENT PROGRESS
AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
By integrating evidence from
neuroimaging with evidence of behavioral
transformations specified in particular
traditional descriptions of meditation
practices, some important obstacles may
be mitigated. For instance, in an adap-
tation of the Mahasi method developed
by Shinzen Young, practitioners use the
label “Gone” to refer to the “fruition”
experience of cessation described above.
According to Young, this kind of expe-
rience is not uncommon for advanced
practitioners (Young, 2013). Indeed, in
a recent study conducted with adept
practitioners of this system, two subjects
reported having a temporary experience
of cessation while in the scanner environ-
ment. The methodology was unique in
this experiment given that button presses
were used to indicate temporal mark-
ers associated with peak level of clarity
or contact with a sustained period of
“rest” that follows ordinary experience of
a particular sensory object passing or van-
ishing from conscious awareness. Using
traditional methods of fMRI analyses, we
were able to investigate the functional
correlates of the deeper experiences of
cessation in comparison to the more com-
mon experience of the passing away of
a sensory object. The preliminary results
suggest a number of very unique func-
tional changes in particular brain regions
that were similar in activation for “rest”
in the other meditators, but the magni-
tude of the hemodynamic change from
baseline was much larger. For example, the
frontal polar cortex (Brodmann area-10), a
specialized area for higher cognitive func-
tions (Koechlin et al., 1999; Ramnani and
Owen, 2004), showed dramatic increases
in functional activity (>50% BOLD signal
change) that were not as large for the other
meditators. As interesting as this prelimi-
nary finding is, we can not simply say we
found the neural correlate of cessation, but
rather a potential neural marker for the
experience of “Gone” in Young’s system
of training that is relative to the baseline
state of mind wandering in this individ-
ual. Because of the limitations associated
with traditional analyses, we are currently
attempting to explore this state using more
novel methods that do not require the state
of interest to be contrasted with a state of
no interest, such as state space analyses
[see Janoos et al. (2011)].
One major problem in using neu-
roimaging methodology is that it is typ-
ically dependent upon the general linear
model (GLM), a convenient method that
flexibly allows for both linear regression
and ANOVA; however, the model relies on
assumptions that may not hold in all sit-
uations. For example, fMRI has a poor
temporal resolution limited by a hemo-
dynamic response function for each brain
response or “state” that is approximately
12 s in duration; any attempts at explor-
ing discrete states within this timeframe
is likely to be influenced by “bleeding
over” of hemodynamic activity from the
previous state. Furthermore, another lim-
itation of the GLM is its dependence on
creating a contrast between states of inter-
est and some other state of no interest.
The assumptions and limitations are likely
to fail in attempts to capture the sub-
tle changes associated with normative, but
transitory, states of enlightenment.
Nonetheless, important progress has
been made. Some studies investigating
long-term meditators with mixed tradi-
tions have attempted to map correlational
neurophysiology with first-person experi-
ences of clarity, somatic awareness, non-
duality, and mind-wandering in adept
meditators (Lutz et al., 2004; Josipovic
et al., 2012; Garrison et al., 2013; Hagerty
et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2013; Vago et al.,
2013). Indeed, neural correlates of particu-
lar meditative states show a developmental
trajectory, such that there is a similar pat-
tern of development regardless of cultural
background or technique early on in med-
itative naïve practitioners, but that such
markers change throughout expertise and
experience (e.g., Brefczynski-Lewis et al.,
2007). More recently, attempts have been
made to operationalize meditation in very
specific contexts of automaticity (Travis,
2011) and non-duality (Josipovic, 2010).
Some studies have focused on expert prac-
titioners with the assumption that unique
neurophysiology amongst these medita-
tors (in comparison to meditation naïve
control subjects) may point to particu-
lar biomarkers of advancement toward
end-goals of practice. For example, Lutz
et al. (2004) found gamma band elec-
troencephalography (EEG) power over lat-
eral frontal and parietal electrode sites
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to correlate (r = 0.69) with self-reported
clarity in expert Tibetan practitioners
of “non-referential compassion” (Tibetan:
dmigs med snying rje), suggesting a partic-
ular mechanism for increased phenomenal
intensity. More recently, a number of stud-
ies have also found gamma band activity
across different electrode sites to correlate
with particularmeditative states across dif-
ferent contemplative traditions (Lehmann
et al., 2001; Vialatte et al., 2009; Cahn
et al., 2010, 2013; Rubik, 2011; Berkovich-
Ohana et al., 2012; Ferrarelli et al., 2013;
Kozhevnikov et al., 2013), some suggesting
increased gamma power correlates with
level of experience and may be a marker
of plasticity that remains during restful or
even states of deep sleep (Ferrarelli et al.,
2013).
CONCLUSIONS
Scientific investigation of mindfulness
and meditation have already arguably
advanced the field of neuroscience and
specifically our knowledge of the brain
(e.g., “resting states”) in the context of
functional neuroimaging [see Holzel et al.
(2011); Vago and Silbersweig (2012) for
review]. Once biomarkers are established
for progress along the paths outlined in
particular traditions, these can be used
as feedback (e.g., Garrison et al., 2013),
or for therapeutic targets in the context
of neuropsychiatry. It is therefore, neces-
sary to responsibly unpack traditional con-
structs into common psychological and
neurocognitive terms that can correlate
with first-person experience with some
consistency, but without unwittingly dis-
missing the deepest andmost fundamental
features of the practices from which they
originate. We are, in the end, cautiously
optimistic that progress can be made on
well-defined projects in this area that inte-
grate behavior and phenomenology with
neuroimaging evidence, but not without a
careful consideration of the methodologi-
cal obstacles. Responsible scientific investi-
gations of enlightenment can proceed only
on the basis of rigorous understanding
of particular experiential states or behav-
ioral traits within a particular tradition
as part of a whole value system, embed-
ded in many other aspects of the models
employed in that specific tradition of how
the mind works and how awakening pro-
gresses.
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